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Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing To Sue
Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of
the Rule of Illinois Brick*
William M. Landest
Richard A. Posnertt
Many producers do not sell directly to their ultimate consum-
ers. The producer of a consumer good may, for example, sell it to a
wholesaler who will resell it to a retailer who in turn will resell it to
the ultimate consumer, and even if there is no wholesale stage of
distribution, the ultimate consumer will ordinarily be the direct
purchaser from a retailer and only an "indirect purchaser" from the
producer. The product, may be used as an input into a final con-
sumer good-for example, the flour sold to a baker who makes it
into bread that is sold to the consumer. The product may not even
appear physically in the final good-for example, the oven used by
the baker in making the bread. In these cases as well, the ultimate
consumer is only an indirect purchaser of the flour or the oven, the
cost of which will be reflected in the price of the bread.
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,' the Sureme Court held that
indirect purchasers do not have standing to sue for violations of the
antitrust laws under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 2 which authorizes
private treble-damage suits by individuals or firms injured in their
business or property by a violation of those laws. To understand this
decision, one must go back to Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.,3 a suit by a shoe manufacturer against a manufac-
turer of shoe machinery who had earlier been found to have monopo-
lized the shoe machinery industry in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.' The defendant argued that it should be allowed to
show that its customer had not in fact been injured by the antitrust
violation because the customer had passed on the costs of the viola-
* This article is based on testimony the authors gave before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 14, 1979. Although
we were asked to testify by the Business Roundtable, the views expressed in our testimony
and contained in this article are our own and are not necessarily shared by the Roundtable.
t Professor of Economics, The University of Chicago Law School.
it Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
' 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
3 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
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tion to its customers, the purchasers of shoes. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, holding that there is no "passing on" de-
fense to a suit by a direct purchaser; the direct purchaser is entitled
to get the overcharge back, trebled, whether or not he was really
injured to that extent.
Illinois Brick is the mirror image of Hanover Shoe. The plain-
tiffs in Illinois Brick, represented by the state of Illinois suing on
behalf of itself and some 700 local governmental entities in the
Chicago area, claimed overcharges in connection with various con-
struction projects. The defendants, manufacturers and distributors
of concrete block alleged to be in collusion, sold the block to ma-
sonry contractors who submitted bids to general contractors who in
turn submitted bids to customers such as the plaintiffs. 5 The Illinpis
Brick plaintiffs were therefore indirect purchasers of concrete block,
standing in the same relation to the defendants as the buyers of
shoes at retail stood to United Shoe Machinery Corporation. The
predicate of the Illinois Brick suit was the passing on of all or part
of the overcharge by the direct purchaser; without passing on, there
could be no injury to indirect purchasers.
Unless they are willing to countenance multiple liability,' the
courts cannot allow suits by indirect purchasers without also per-
mitting the defendant to assert a "passing-on defense" against di-
rect purchaser plaintiffs. As the Court recognized in Illinois Brick,
there are only two ways of avoiding unacceptable multiple liability:
(1) allow indirect purchasers to sue but overrule Hanover Shoe or
(2) retain Hanover Shoe and preclude indirect purchasers from
suing.' All legislative attempts to overrule the rule of Illinois Brick
recognize that some mechanism must be included to prevent multi-
ple liability. A recent version of such a bill8 would have permitted
defendants to raise the passing-on defense "in the discretion of the
court" in suits by direct purchasers; an earlier version9 required the
courts to permit the defense. In short, to permit suits by indirect
purchasers requires the recognition of a passing-on defense against
direct purchasers.'" To overrule Illinois Brick is to overrule Hanover
Shoe.
431 U.S. at 726.
'The Court rejected the option of multiple liability in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251 (1972).
Id. at 736.
S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978), reprinted in 899 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) at A-14 (Feb. 2, 1979). As reported out of committee, the bill dropped the "in discre-
tion" qualification to the passing-on defense.
S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977).
I As the Court pointed out, lower federal courts prior to Illinois Brick that allowed
indirect purchaser suits all provided some form of passing-on defense. 431 U.S. at.731 n.11.
1979]
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The decision in Illinois Brick was seen in some quarters as a
serious setback for private antitrust enforcement, and, as men-
tioned, there have been efforts to overrule it legislatively." The
strongest supporters of this movement are the state attorneys gen-
eral. The parens patriae bill passed in 197612 had given the states
the right to bring antitrust treble-damage actions on behalf of con-
sumers in their states but had not, at least expressly, altered the
rules of standing. Most such actions were expected to be brought on
behalf of indirect purchasers.' 3 By holding that consumers do not
have standing to sue remote sellers, the Court in Illinois Brick
greatly reduced the number of parens patriae actions that could be
brought. 4
The question whether to overrule Illinois Brick by legislation
and allow indirect purchasers to sue has many interesting aspects,
such as the feasibility and design of procedural mechanisms for
avoiding multiple liability. We, however, address a more fundamen-
tal question: assuming the procedural details could be worked out,
would the objectives of the antitrust laws be advanced or retarded
by allowing indirect purchasers to sue? This question, we believe,
can be fruitfully addressed with the assistance of economic analysis.
That analysis leads us to conclude that allowing indirect purchasers
to sue would probably retard rather than advance antitrust enforce-
ment. The basis for this conclusion lies in the detrimental impact
that allowing a passing-on defense would have on enforcement by
direct purchasers.' 5
" For a detailed account of this legislative movement see Note, Treble Damages and the
Indirect Purchaser Problem: Considerations for a Congressional Overturning of illinois Brick,
39 Omo ST. L.J. 545 (1978).
" 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
, Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens
Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 83 YALE L.J. 626, 632-33 (1976).
" Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 47 U.S.L.W. 4672 (U.S. June 11, 1979) (consumers who
pay higher prices for goods sustain injury in "property" actionable under Clayton Act section
4).
Is The question of the effect of allowing indirect purchasers to sue is not only an impor-
tant one for the student of antitrust policy; it has a broader scholarly interest as an aspect of
the general question of private enforcement of law. Economists in recent years have turned
their attention to law enforcement and efforts have been made to discuss the conditions under
which private law enforcement will yield efficient results. See K. ELZiNGA & W. BRErr, THE
ANTThuST PENALTIES: A STun IN LAW ANm ECONoWCs(1976); Becker & Stigler, Law Enforce-
ment, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Landes &
Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL ST. 1 (1975). This paper is a continua-
tion of these efforts with reference to a specific and timely question in the design of optimal
systems of private law enforcement.
[46:602
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I. THE ROLE OF THE COMPENSATORY OBJECTIVE IN ANALYZING THE
RULE IN Illinois Brick
Private antitrust enforcement is traditionally viewed as haring
two objectives: to compensate victims of antitrust violations and to
deter the commission of such violations. When the two objectives
come into conflict, however, we believe that achievement of the
goals of the antitrust laws requires that deterrence be preferred. If
most antitrust violations were deterred, the occasions for compen-
sation would be few. The converse is not true: even if the victims
of antitrust overcharges were fully reimbursed, the social 'ineffici-
encies of the violations would persist. Therefore, the rule of Illinois
Brick is preferable if, as we argue later in this article, it better deters
antitrust violations than the alternative rule, even though it denies
full compensation to some persons harmed by the violations.
Even if the goal of compensation merited a higher priority in
antitrust law than we think it does, overruling Illinois Brick and
allowing indirect purchasers to bring antitrust damage actions
would not measurably advance that goal. Admittedly, some victims
of proven violations are denied legal damages by the rule of Illinois
Brick. But those victims obtain, in the form of lower prices, a bene-
fit equivalent to the anticipated value of the antitrust damage
claims that they are denied, discounted for the uncertainties of
recovery. To explain, consider a simplified distribution chain con-
sisting of suppliers of input A, direct purchasers who incorporate A
into final product X, and consumers of X, who are also indirect
purchasers of A. Suppose the direct purchasers of A suspect the
existence of a cartel among the suppliers of A. Under the rule of
Illinois Brick, the real net price per unit of A will be lower than the
stated price charged for A by an amount equal to three times the
full estimated amount of the overcharge multiplied by the esti-
mated probability of a successful antitrust suit against suppliers of
A. This discount or offset reduces the direct purchaser's incentive
to substitute away from input A, lowers the expected marginal cost
of producing X, and, crucially, lowers the price of X compared to
the case in which no antitrust recovery is anticipated by direct
purchasers. The adjustments in the price of X that take place in the
market in response to Illinois Brick have the effect of compensating
the indirect purchaser of A for the possibility of an illegal over-
charge. Compensation takes the form of a lower price for product X
as the direct purchaser of A passes on to the indirect purchaser the
1979]
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expected value of his antitrust claim against the suppliers of A.'"
Now consider the impact of reversing Illinois Brick and permit-
ting the indirect purchaser to sue the suppliers of input A. The
expected value of the direct purchaser's legal claim is reduced be-
cause now he is entitled to recover only (three times) the amount of
the illegal overcharge that is not passed on. Hence, both the ex-
pected price of A and the marginal cost of X will be greater than
under the rule of Illinois Brick. As a consequence, the price of X will
increase. Purchasers of X will be willing to pay a higher price than
before for a given quantity of X because they now have a potential
legal claim against the suppliers of A. Thus, under a rule reversing
Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers pay a somewhat higher price for
X in exchange for an entitlement to a possible antitrust recovery.
More broadly, an antitrust claim is equivalent to a valuable,
though risky, asset that includes a zero recovery as one possible
outcome. Under Illinois Brick, the entire antitrust claim, including
the possible zero-recovery outcome, is vested in the direct pur-
chaser. Indirect purchasers are compensated for relinquishing their
legal claims by being charged lower prices. The risk of antitrust
litigation is borne by the direct purchaser, who may or may not
realize a return on his legal claim, while indirect purchasers receive
a certain benefit based on the anticipated value of the claim. Over-
ruling Illinois Brick would cause direct and indirect purchasers to
share the risk and the possible return on the antitrust claim, and
the price of products such as X would increase to compensate the
direct purchaser for the lower expected value of his antitrust claim.
Thus, the choice between the rule of Illinois Brick or its alternative
will affect only the form, and not the amount, of compensation that
accrues to ultimate consumers as a group. Moreover, for individual
consumers of many different final products over many years, their
total level of compensation under Illinois Brick will approximate
that under the alternative rule.17
" This argument does not depend on the degree of competition assumed at the direct-
purchaser level. Even if the direct purchaser were a monopolist, a reduction in his expected
marginal cost would lead him to choose a lower profit-maximizing price.
11 Several additional points should be noted. First, the above analysis implicitly assumes
that the level of deterrence is independent of Illinois Brick or its alternative. If it is not (and
we show in Parts H and I that it is not), then compensation will be affected by the choice
of legal rule. For example, if enforcement incentives were sufficiently weakened by overruling
Illinois Brick that virtually no price fixers were convicted, then neither direct nor indirect
purchasers would be compensated.
Second, our discussion implicitly assumes that purchasers are risk neutral. Thus, the
increased price of X that indirect purchasers would pay if Illinois Brick were overruled just
equals the expected dollar value per unit of X of'their antitrust claim. If risk aversion or
[46:602
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Of course, some buyers may not anticipate, and thus take ac-
count of, possible antitrust recoveries in their purchasing decisions.
To the extent that they do not, the force of the foregoing argument
is lessened. Even so, there is another independent reason why re-
versing Illinois Brick is unlikely to advance the compensatory objec-
tive of antitrust enforcement. The effect of a price increase due to
price fixing or some other antitrust violation tends, as we show later,
to be broadly distributed among the suppliers of and the purchasers
(mainly ultimate consumers) from the producer whose price in-
creases. Rules of standing that would be unaffected by overruling
Illinois Brick will ordinarily bar suppliers from maintaining actions
to recover the losses caused them by price fixing. While ultimate
consumers could, in principle, obtain damages if Illinois Brick were
overruled, normally they could do so only through class actions. But
the administrative costs of the consumer class action tend to eat up
any damage award or settlement; little compensation may actually
trickle down to the individual members of the class. 8 Nor are parens
patriae actions, an alternative to the class-action approach, the
answer to this problem. They have the same or similar problems as
preference were a factor, then further refinements in the analysis would be necessary, al-
though the basic result-that compensation is independent of the legal rule-would not be
altered significantly. For example, if direct purchasers were risk neutral but indirect purchas-
ers (consumers) were risk averse, overruling Illinois Brick would lead to a smaller increase in
the price of X because indirect purchasers would be receiving a risky asset (i.e., their antitrust
claims) in exchange for a higher price, with certainty, of X.
Third, bringing anticipation of antitrust damages into the analysis has implications for
resource allocation as well as for compensation. For example, if the probability of discovering
and successfully prosecuting price-fixing suppliers is one-third, then under Illinois Brick or
its alternative the value of the deadweight loss from a monopoly or cartel price will approach
zero. To illustrate, if the illegal overcharge per unit of A is $1, then the expected value of the
antitrust recovery under Illinois Brick would equal $1 (=(1/3)$1(3)) and hence the expected
price of A and marginal cost of X would not change compared to the precartel level. Since
this would leave the output of X constant, the deadweight loss from the cartel would approach
zero. (Deadweight losses would still be positive since enforcement expenditures by plaintiffs
and defendants consume real resources.) Deadweight losses will also result when the expected
value of the antitrust recovery differs from the size of the illegal overcharge. For example, if
the former were less than the latter, direct purchasers would substitute away from A, the
expected marginal costs and price of X would increase, and the output of X would fall below
the precartel level. Alternatively, if the expected value of the recovery were greater than the
illegal overcharge, the price of X would fall and output would rise relative to the precartel
level. In both cases, resources would be inefficiently allocated and deadweight losses would
occur. Although the level of compensation of indirect purchasers would depend on the rela-
tionship between the size of the expected antitrust recovery and the illegal overcharge, the
distribution of compensation between direct and indirect purchasers would still be indepen-
dent of Illinois Brick or its alternative.
11 431 U.S. at 747 n.31; Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 56-61 (1975); Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 440 (1973).
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class actions with respect to notice, opting in or out, and allocation
and distribution of damage awards.'"
Other indirect purchasers, such as retailers in a two-tiered
(wholesale and retail) distribution system, may be in.a better posi-
tion to collect a meaningful judgment than the ultimate consumer.
But since they, like direct purchasers, will often be able to pass on
much of the cost of an unlawful price increase to their customers
and suppliers, allowing them to sue may not substantially further
the compensatory objective either. Moreover, if, as we argue below, 20
overruling Illinois Brick would probably reduce the overall deterrent
efficacy of antitrust enforcement, the benefits that some consumers
might obtain from being allowed to bring indirect-purchaser class
actions could be offset by the costs to other consumers, who would
pay higher prices because of the increased number of antitrust viola-
tions.
11. THE EFFECT ON DETERRENCE OF ALLOWING INDIRECT PURCHASERS
TO SUE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Having shown that overruling Illinois Brick is unlikely to have
much effect in promoting the compensatory objective of the anti-
trust laws-even assuming that compensation is a significant objec-
tive of the antitrust laws when in conflict with the deterrent objec-
tive of those laws-we turn to the question of the likely impact on
deterrence of overruling Illinois Brick. The most important consid-
eration from the standpoint of deterrence is not who receives the
proceeds of any judgment levied against the antitrust violator, but
that there be adequate incentives to bring suit and prosecute it to
judgment.2 1 This objective is more likely to be achieved by the rule
of Illinois Brick, which favors direct-purchaser suits, than by a rule
favoring indirect-purchaser suits. First, the direct purchaser is a
more efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws than the indirect pur-
See generally Handler & Blechman, supra note 13. As the Supreme Court has pointed
out, Congress did not expect the parens patriae legislation to result in recoveries of small
claims by individual consumers; rather, undistributed portions of the damages would be
sizable and would be added to state revenues or used for other public purposes. 431 U.S. at
747 n.31. The benefits to the actual victims of the price fixing from these uses of the damages
would often be negligible.
20 See Parts II & I infra.
21 This assumes that the judgment approximates the social costs of the violation, ad-
justed to reflect the probability that the violator will be brought to bar. If that probability is
less than one, the judgment should be larger than the estimated social costs of the violation
so that the expected cost of punishment to the antitrust violator will equal the estimated
social costs. This is the economic rationale of trebling.
[46:602
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chaser and should therefore be given maximum incentive to bring
antitrust suits. Second, the problem of apportioning damages
among direct and indirect purchasers would be so costly that it
would decrease the incentives of any purchaser to sue. Third, even
if direct and indirect purchasers were equally efficient antitrust
enforcers, and even if allocation problems could be solved without
seriously depleting the recovery pool, deterrence would be weakened
if the right to sue were divided among more parties so that each
claim was relatively small.
A. Relative Information Costs of Direct and Indirect Purchasers
The direct purchaser is a more efficient enforcer of the antitrust
laws than the indirect purchaser because of the former's closer prox-
imity to the violator. The direct purchaser deals directly with the
violator, and probably with his competitors, and he is therefore in
a better position than a more remote purchaser to detect a conspir-
acy or other antitrust violation. The remote purchaser may not
know that a price increase to him is attributable to a price increase
by a remote supplier, and even if he does know, he will find it
difficult to discover the reasons for the remote supplier's price in-
crease.
Not only does the remote purchaser lack direct knowledge of
the business of the supplier who has raised prices, he must also
undertake efforts (unnecessary for a direct purchaser) to determine
which remote supplier is responsible for the price increase. To ex-
plain, assume that the producers of product A fix the price at a level
above the competitive price. Product A is an input into a product
that ultimately reaches consumers after successive stages in the
production distribution chain. Assume further that producers of A
are located at point n on the distribution chain; producers using A
are located at point n-1; and the consumer is located at point 0, as
in Figure 1.
consumer producer of
AI I I I
0 1 2 n-1 it
Figure 1
For example, if n=4, at point n are raw material producers fixing
prices, at n-1 are manufacturers (the direct purchasers), and at n-
2, n-3 and n-4 (=0) are wholesalers, retailers, and final consumers
(the indirect purchasers), respectively.
1979]
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Since the increase in the price of A will be transmitted through
the entire distribution system, each purchaser will experience an
increase in the price charged by one of his suppliers-the supplier
who connects him to the distribution chain that originates with the
producers of A. Each purchaser, however, will be uncertain about
the cause of the price increase. It may be due to a price-fixing
agreement entered into by his supplier or simply to legitimate in-
creases in his supplier's costs, such as an increase in the price of
some input into the supplier's product. The purchaser will have to
invest resources to determine which of the two alternative explana-
tions of the price increase is correct. If the legal rule entitles only
the direct purchaser from the antitrust violator to sue, each pur-
chaser in the distribution chain will investigate only the link or
stage in the chain directly above him. Since there are n links in the
chain (from 0 to point n-I in Figure 1), the maximum number of
searches that will take place before the price-fixing scheme is uncov-
ered is n.22
But suppose the legal rule is modified to permit any purchaser,
direct or indirect, to recover damages from the fixing of the price of
A. Now a purchaser at any point j on the distribution line will have
an incentive to search for information on price fixing not only at
point j+1 but also at points j+2, j+3, . . . , n. If, for example, each
firm on the distribution line in Figure 1 produces its output using
two inputs supplied by two different suppliers, then purchasers at j
will search over one input supplier at j+ 1, two input suppliers at
j+2, two at j+3, . . . , and two at n. 2 To uncover the price-fixing
scheme at n, therefore, purchasers at j would have to search over
2(n-j)-I suppliers. Since purchasers at each stage in the distribution
chain have a similar incentive to search over suppliers above them
in the distribution chain, one can show that, when indirect purchas-
ers are permitted to recover damages, the maximum number of
22 In terms "of Figure 1, consumers at point 0 will search over firms at point 1, firms at 1
will search over firms at point 2, and so forth. Assuming that each firm searches, the aggregate
number of searches is n times the average number of firms or persons searching at each point.
To simplify, we define a unit of search as all search activity from point i to j (iAj) on the
distribution chain.
2 The reason that the purchaser atj searches over one supplier atj+1 but two each at
j+2 through n is that, although his direct supplier's price has risen, he lacks information on
which of the two inputs produced at j+2, .... n has increased in price. Suppose each firm
in the distribution chain were supplied by two different firms, and a searcher had to search
over all firms at each point in the distribution chain. In this case, j would search over 1
supplier at j+1, 2 at j+2, 4 at j+3, 8 at j+4, and up to 2n-.-1 at n. This would imply, for
example, that if n=4, ultimate consumers might have to search over 15 suppliers (compared
to 7 in the analysis in the text) to discover the price fixer.
[46:602
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searches equals n2.24
Searching for an antitrust violation is, of course, a costly activ-
ity. If each unit of search costs $X, then in the above example it will
cost in the aggregate at most n$X to uncover the price-fixing agree-
ment when the legal rule gives the direct purchaser the exclusive
right to recover, and at most n 2$X when the rule allows indirect
purchasers also to recover. Thus, as a first approximation, the
indirect-purchaser rule increases the aggregate costs of searching for
an antitrust violation by the amount (n2-n)$X compared to the
direct-purchaser rule.2 This means that if, for example, there are
four stages in the distribution chain-as there would be where the
price fixer sold some input to a manufacturer (stage 1), who incorpo-
rated it into a product that he sold to a wholesaler (stage 2), who
resold to a retailer (stage 3), who resold to the final consumer (stage
4)-so that n=4-then (if there are two inputs at each stage) the
cost of searching for the antitrust violation could be fifteen times as
great under a rule allowing indirect purchasers to sue than under the
rule of Illinois Brick. From the social point of view this added ex-
penditure is a waste of resources since, by assumption, the antitrust
violation is discovered under either rule.
24 The maximum number of searches equals
n-i
Smax = I [k(n-j-1)+l]
j=O
= nnk.k.
n- --L+1)
2 2
where k is the number of inputs supplied at each point. When k=2, Smax simplifies to n2 .
We say "as a first approximation" advisedly. The difference in aggregate search costs
may be less or more than (n-n)$X. They may be less for two reasons:
(1) The costs of an unsuccessful search are likely to be less than the costs of a successful
one because the former will exclude various litigation expenditures once it is determined that
the supplier was not fixing prices. If we let $Y equal the costs of an unsuccessful search and
$X equal the costs of a successful one, then aggregate costs are $X + (n-1) $Y and n$X +
n(n-1)$Y under the direct and indirect-purchaser rules respectively. The difference between
them is (n-1)$X + (n-1)2 $Ywhich is obviously less than (n2-n)$X provided $X > $Y.
(2) When indirect purchasers are allowed to recover, there is an incentive for the various
parties to avoid costly duplication of effort by agreeing to restrict their search activity, share
in all search costs, and pool all information that is acquired. This would approach the result
of the direct-purchaser rule if the various parties agreed to restrict their activity to their direct
suppliers only. Since the costs of reaching a full agreement are positive and probably prohibi-
tive (because the interests of the parties will diverge on other issues such as the extent of
passing on), the costs of the indirect-purchaser rule will always be greater than that of the
direct-purchaser rule.
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This analysis can be made more concrete by reference to the
facts of the Illinois Brick case itself. The alleged price fixers were
manufacturers of cement blocks who sold them to masonry contrac-
tors who supplied their services to general contractors who in turn
sold buildings incorporating the cement blocks to the ultimate con-
sumers. For those consumers to have identified the source of the
added cost of buildings (assuming they even noticed the added cost
due to the price fixing of cement blocks) would have required them
to study the conduct of the general contractors, identify their sup-
pliers, and trace the inputs used by those suppliers to their ultimate
source. Only then would the consumers have identified the manu-
facturers of cement blocks as the ultimate source of their injury.
This would have been a highly complicated and expensive search
process compared to what the masonry contractors-the direct pur-
chasers of the cement blocks-would have had to undertake in order
to determine that the manufacturers of the blocks were engaged in
price fixing."
The availability of a passing-on defense will often have the
effect of'reducing the incentive to sue of intermediate purchasers-
whose potential claims might otherwise be larger-to a point below
the level at which litigating would be an attractive option. There-
fore, if indirect-purchaser suits are permitted, those indirect pur-
chasers who sue will ordinarily be ultimate consumers whose small
claims can be vindicated only through the medium of class actions.
But class action suits are unsatisfactory enforcement devices be-
cause the lawyers who represent consumer class-action plaintiffs
There is a factor that works in the direction of increasing the relative costs of the in-
direct purchaser compared to the analysis in the text, however. We assumed constant costs
of search at each stage of the distribution chain ($X in the text and a combination of $X and
$Y in this footnote). If the number of parties searching decreases as one goes from point 0
(the ultimate consumer) to point n-1, the costs of search are likely to decrease as well. This,
in turn, will widen the difference in search costs between the indirect and direct-purchaser
rules.
26 Of course, class actions comprising ultimate consumers were brought in Illinois Brick,
but it does not follow that the consumers, or their class representative, undertook any such
complicated search process. They may have "piggybacked" on direct-purchaser plaintiffs or,
since the state represented the class, obtained information of the antitrust violations from a
government investigation or complaint. Indeed, the very cost of the search process described
above, especially for ultimate consumers, makes it unlikely that such searches are often
undertaken, and thus biases reported cases in favor of those where indirect purchasers learn
of their remote suppliers' behavior through serendipitous means. But where this is so, the
entitlement of purchasers who have not borne any of the costs of investigation to share in
the damages awarded reduces the incentives of other more favorably situated potential plain-
tiffs, such as direct purchasers, to bear those costs. This point is developed at pp. 621-25 infra.
[46:602
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appear to lack adequate incentives to press for the largest possible
judgment, even in meritorious cases. Their interests may be better
served by agreeing to a settlement that provides for a relatively
small judgment but large attorneys' fees-a settlement result also
attractive to defendants.27 The individual class member's stake is
too small to give him any incentive to supervise the lawyer for the
class, so the usual checks on a lawyer's conflict of interest with his
client are lacking.? It does not follow that the consumer class action
has no deterrent effect, but its deterrent effect may be less than that
of first-purchaser suits.
Nor is the recently authorized parens patriae suit the answer
to the problem of deterrence. Given the political character of parens
patriae enforcement, it is doubtful that it can be relied upon as an
adequate antitrust deterrent. There may well be a tendency under
parens patriae for state attorneys general to bring headline-
grabbing, scapegoat-seeking suits against politically unpopular cor-
porations, with little regard for the intrinsic antitrust merit of the
suit and with little effort to press the suit to a successful conclusion.
By the time the case is ready for trial, the state attorney general's
office may be occupied by a new politician with little interest in
carrying out the projects of his predecessor.
The only argument we have heard that direct purchasers may
be less efficient enforcers than indirect purchasers is that the first
purchaser may be reluctant to sue his supplier lest an ongoing rela-
tionship beneficial to the purchaser be disrupted .2 This argument
overlooks the fact that the direct purchaser's acquiescence in his
seller's antitrust violations will normally be a compensated ac-
quiescence. A rational profit-maximizing firm will not abandon a
legal right with some dollar value unless it receives concessions of
equivalent value. From the standpoint of deterring antitrust viola-
21 See Posner, supra note 18, at 440-41. For empirical support of this proposition see
Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1976),
finding that attorneys' fees in antitrust class actions are greater when cases are settled than
when they are tried, holding constant the amount of damages awarded the class. This pattern
is suggestive of the kind of "deal" that we worry about in such actions.
n Although the court exercises supervision over the settlement of class actions, this
supervision can hardly be as effective as that of an interested client over his attorney.
29 Illinois Attorney General William Scott, a major proponent of legislation to overrule
Illinois Brick, has stated:
Unless our office and the other Attorneys General have the authority to protect the tax
dollars of our citizens from these antitrust violators, no one will. Contractors and other
middlemen who sell commodities to governmental entities have no real incentive to sue
their suppliers for illegal overcharge and risk their availability of supplies when they can
and do pass along the inflated cost.
Newsletter from W. Scott, Attorney General, State of Illinois (May 3, 1979).
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tions, these concessions constitute a form of antitrust damages. If a
supplier wants to buy his purchasers' silence, the price he will have
to pay is, in effect, his punishment for the illegal activity that he is
trying to conceal. That price will be greater under the Illinois Brick
rule because the expected value of the direct purchaser's antitrust
claim is greater when no part of the recovery is distributed to indi-
rect purchasers. Overruling Illinois Brick would reduce the price of
the direct purchaser's silence, and thereby reduce the expected costs
of price fixing and hence the deterrent effect of private enforcement.
In any event, the idea that purchasers are bashful about suing
their suppliers is today unrealistic, almost quaint. Firms now bring
antitrust suits at the drop of a hat-and are subject to severe criti-
cism, and potentially to shareholders' derivative actions, if they
forgo an opportunity to bring a meritorious suit. Nor is it realistic
to think that potential antitrust plaintiffs fear retaliation by a sued
supplier: retaliation would simply clinch the plaintiff's original case
as well as give him an additional antitrust cause of action. Empiri-
cal evidence on the alleged reluctance of purchasers to sue their
suppliers is difficult to obtain. But the large number of private
antitrust suits alleging price fixing that are brought each year, most
of which are direct-purchaser suits,30 provides at least suggestive
evidence in support of our view that direct purchasers are not reluc-
tant to sue their suppliers.
If we are correct that the first purchaser is the more efficient
enforcer of the antitrust laws than the indirect purchaser, it follows
that the rules of standing should be designed in such a way as to
give the direct purchaser the maximum incentive to sue. The rule
of Illinois Brick accomplishes this by allowing the direct purchasers
to sue -for treble the entire overcharge, '31 without subtracting the
" Evidence on the relative importance of direct and indirect-purchaser suits is available
in the appendices to written statements in Fair and Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws: Hearings on S. 1874 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1978). For example, a study of antitrust
cases in the Southern District of New York in 1977 indicated that out of a total of 69 suits
brought by purchasers, 66, or 96 percent, were direct-purchaser suits, id. at 26-31. A similar
study of 197 pending cases in the Northern District of California showed that out of a total
of 163 purchaser suits, 67 percent were direct-purchaser suits, 23 percent were indirect-
purchaser suits, and the rest involved both direct and indirect purchasers, id. at 361-72. A
study of 53 pending cases in the District of Arizona revealed that out of a total of 32 purchaser
suits, 81 percent were direct-purchaser suits, 3 percent were indirect, and the rest involved
both direct and indirect purchasers, id. at 375-78.
" Actually, the overcharge paid by the purchaser understates the social costs of the
antitrust violation. It ignores both the injury to those who stop purchasing the product
because of the price increase and the possibility that the antitrust violation may have raised
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amount of that overcharge passed on to more remote purchasers.
Unless multiple liability is to be created, an indirect-purchaser suit
necessarily weakens-and at the extreme eliminates-the incentive
of the first purchaser to sue, by decreasing his recovery. Thus, the
question is presented whether the predictable reduction in the in-
centive of direct purchasers to sue if Illinois Brick were statutorily
overruled would be outweighed by the predictable increase in the
incentive of indirect purchasers to sue. Since the first purchaser js
the more efficient (lower cost) enforcer, the answer to the question
is n o . "
B. Implementing a Passing-On Defense
As noted above, overruling Illinois Brick would imply restoring
the passing-on defense that was rejected in Hanover Shoe. It is this
feature that leads to the undesirable incentive effects discussed
above. In addition, the implementation of a passing-on defense,
that is, the apportionment of damages among the various tiers in
the distribution chain, would involve extremely difficult problems
of economic analysis and measurement. Efforts to solve these prob-
lems would make antitrust litigation even more cumbersome than
it is already and thereby directly reduce the efficiency of the en-
forcement process.
Let us examine the mechanics of apportioning the antitrust
overcharge among the levels of distribution. When a firm is charged
a higher price for one of its inputs (input A) because of an antitrust
violation, its costs increase. The firm will try to offset the increase
by raising its price. If its competitors are not affected by the cost
increase, the attempt will fail,32 and the firm will either go out of
business or contract its output (if by so doing it can lower its costs).
Since, by assumption, there is no possibility of the firm's passing
on the increased price of A to its indirect purchasers, the question
of apportionment of damages does not arise.3 3 But in the more typi-
cal case, and the one we shall focus on here, the increase in the price
of input A affects not just a single firm but an entire industry (or
several industries). That is, all the sellers of a particular product
the costs as well as price of the violator's product. These refinements do not affect the point
made here.
1 When a seller faces a signifcant number of competitors, the elasticity of demand for
its product will be high, meaning that even a small increase in its price will drive customers
to substitute a competitor's product.
13 The firm may be able to pass on part of the price increase in A to its suppliers. See
p. 621.
1979]
HeinOnline  -- 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 615 1978-1979
The University of Chicago Law Review
(product X) pay the higher price. Because the industry faces a
downward-sloping demand curve for X, the reduction in supply
brought about by the cost increase will generate a higher price for
X. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The increase in the price of input
A to the producers of X (the direct purchasers) shifts the industry
supply curve (which is also the industry marginal-cost curve) up-
ward from S to S', resulting in a price increase from Px to P'X to
the indirect purchasers of A and a fall in output from X to X'
S==MC
I Figure 2
I D I
, N quantity
X? X
Notice in Figure 2 that the proportional shift in the marginal
cost curve at a given output is less than the proportional increase
in the price of input A. That is,
MC = B Pa (1)
where MC and Pa denote the percentage increases in marginal cost
(at a given output) and price of A respectively, and, 6 a equals the
share of input A in the marginal costs of X. 3 For example, if input
' See G. BECKFR, ECONO mc THEORY 142-43 (1971). Equation (1) holds only when the
price of other inputs in the production of A remains constant. If the price of other inputs
on average increases as producers of X attempt to substitute away from A when its price
increases, then MC > 8 a Pa. To simplify the presentation we shall assume that (1) does hold.
price
PX
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A's share of marginal cost is 20 percent and the antitrust violation
increases Pa by 10 percent, then the marginal-cost curve in Figure
2 will shift upward by 2 percent.35
Even if we cannot observe directly the increase in the price of
X due to the shift in marginal cost when Pa increases because other
factors operate simultaneously to affect the price of X, we can calcu-
late the magnitude of the increase in marginal cost that is shifted
to demanders of X provided we have information on the elasticities
of both demand and supply. If we denote the proportional increase
in the price of X to indirect purchasers by Px (= (PIx - Px)/Px), it
can be shown that
P, =Mesl/(es+e (2)
where es and ed are the supply and demand elasticities respec-
tively.36 Substituting from equation (1) yields
P= 8a P a eS/(es eg) (3)
Most estimates of elasticities of demand and supply are in the
range of zero to one. (An elasticity of demand of one would mean,
for example, that a one percent increase in price would lead to a
one percent decrease in the quantity demanded.) If, for example,
eS = .4 and ed = .8 and we assume that input A's share of mar-
ginal cost is 20 percent, then equation (3) shows that a 10 percent
increase in the price of A will result in less than a one percent in-
crease (.67 percent) in Px. Even if we reverse the elasticities, let-
ting eS = .8 and ed = .4, the increase in Px is only 1.33 percent.
Thus, indirect purchasers face a negigible increase in price in com-
parison to a direct purchaser whose input price increases by 10
percent.
This example is pertinent to the analysis of relative enforce-
ment efficiencies because it suggests that the impact of price fixing
on the indirect purchaser will be relatively small and therefore diffi-
cult for him to detect. When this factor is combined with the reduc-
tion in enforcement incentives of direct purchasers that results from
their having to divide damages with any indirect purchasers who do
sue, the possibility arises that no party will expend sufficient re-
sources to uncover the price-fixing scheme.
Further, although our analysis indicates that the proportional
increase in the price to the indirect purchaser will ordinarily
3 Our analysis in this section considers the apportionment of damages between direct
and indirect purchasers on the assumption that neither party takes into account possible
antitrust recoveries in their purchasing decisions. But see note 17, supra.
" See C. SHoUP, PuBLic FNANCE 273-74 (1969).
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be relatively small, this does not imply that direct purchasers would
receive the lion's share of the damage recovery if the suit succeeded,
and therefore that their incentive would not be substantially af-
fected by the possibility of indirect-purchaser suits. The propor-
tional increase in marginal cost that is not passed on to the indirect
purchaser equals (4)
- - = 6f ad/( } ed )  (4)
MC-PX~ aaae1e+e)
and the ratio of the proportional increase in price to the indirect
purchaser to the proportional increase in marginal cost absorbed by
the direct purchaser resulting from the increased price of A is given
by / N
Px/(MC-P )-esed" (5)
If we let
X = share of recovery (three times damages or over-
charge) received by direct purchaser,
and
1 - x = share of recovery received by indirect purchaser,
and assume that the indirect purchaser's share in damages is pro-
portional to the amount passed on, it follows that (1 - x)/X= eS/ed,
or
X ed/ *(ed + es) (6)
and
1- --eS/(es + ed). (7)
Thus, when efd =.4 and es =.8, the indirect purchaser will receive
two-thirds of the total recovery even though the price to him in-
creases by only 1.33 percent.37 The party with the largest stake in
the recovery (the indirect purchaser) experiences a negligible in-
crease in price, making it difficult for him to detect the antitrust
violation. The party in the best position to detect the violation (the
direct purchaser) has little incentive to do so because of his rela-
tively small stake in any damage recovery.
Our emphasis has been on the potentially deleterious effect on
the incentive to bring private antitrust suits of requiring apportion-
ment of damage recovery among the direct and indirect purchasers.
The cost and difficulty of making that apportionment present a
37 Of course, if there are many indirect purchasers, as is usually the case, the portion of
the total recovery allocated to each indirect purchaser will be very small.
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separate issue. In particular, apportionment requires knowledge of
the elasticities of supply and demand. Although econometric tech-
niques are available that can, in principle, be used to estimate point
elasticities, there are many practical difficulties with such estima-
tions.3 8 We are fearful of the increase in the costs, time, and uncer-
tainty involved in antitrust enforcement if the passing-on issue is
injected into suits by direct or indirect purchasers. Four considera-
tions make the calculation of elasticities especially difficult.
First, although it is sometimes possible to estimate with a fair
degree of precision either a demand or a supply elasticity, it is
exceedingly difficult to estimate both. Demand estimation is facili-
tated when demand is relatively constant but supply is shifting, so
that the interactions between the (different) supply curves and the
(constant) demand curve enable the points on the demand curve to
be plotted. Under these conditions, however, with supply shifting,
the estimation of the supply curve is difficult. Conversely, where
supply is constant but demand shifting, the estimation of the supply
curve is facilitated because the intersections between the (constant)
supply curve and the (different) demand curves enable points along
the supply curve to be plotted. But then the estimation of demand
is difficult. Trying to identify both demand and supply curves is
often a statistical nightmare.5
Second, the formulas derived above are valid only for small
changes around the initial equilibrium point. Typically, elasticities
will vary at different points along the supply and demand curves,
thus adding another degree of complexity to the estimation process.
Third, when there is only one class of indirect purchasers, only two
elasticity estimates are required, but each time an additional class
is added, two more elasticity estimates are required. Thus, statisti-
cal problems multiply as the distribution chain lengthens. Finally,
elasticities depend on the amount of time buyers and sellers have
in which to adjust to the price change. If there is a lag between the
price-fixing agreement and its discovery (as there must be for dam-
3a Elmer J. Schaefer, who also uses the concepts of supply and demand elasticity to
analyze passing-on questions, see Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage
Actions, An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 883 (1975), is much more
confident than we are of the feasibility of using elasticity estimates to apportion damages
between direct and indirect purchasers. He seems to assume that the sorts of elasticity
estimates made in the academic economic literature could be readily duplicated in antitrust
litigation. See id. at 915-16 & nn.125-26. Yet he does not cite, nor do we know of, a single
case in which an antitrust court has attempted to estimate an elasticity of demand or supply.
3, For a classic statement of these difficulties see Working, What Do Statistical 'Demand
Curves' Show?, 41 Q.J. ECON. 212 (1927), reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 97 (G. Stigler
& K. Boulding eds. 1952).
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ages to occur), the amount of passing on in each period will depend
on the relative changes in the demand and supply elasticities. Ac-
curate apportionment will then require estimating the changes in
elasticities over time.
In short, constructing the empirical counterparts of the curves
in Figure 2 in an individual case would present severe difficulties of
proof. There would be a serious danger of inconsistent determina-
tions of the key parameters in the various indirect-purchaser ac-
tions, raising the specter of multiple recovery in some cases and
inadequate recovery in others. The alternative would be massive
and potentially unmanageable consolidation of a myriad of separate
claims. In this perspective, a considerable advantage of the direct-
purchaser action is that ordinarily the number of direct purchasers
from a particular supplier is many fewer than the number of indirect
purchasers, thus facilitating effective antitrust enforcement.
Our concern with encumbering the trial of antitrust cases with
incidence analysis is not aesthetic in character; nor is it based on a
distaste for introducing economic analysis into antitrust litigation.
But the injection of difficult empirical economic issues into an anti-
trust suit is a source of added cost and uncertainty. It is a step that
should not be taken where, as in this context, it promises no increase
in the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement.
A further point should be noted. Were it feasible to measure
elasticities of demand and supply, as required to implement a
passing-on defense, the implications for the trial of antitrust cases
in general would be revolutionary. For example, it is the assumed
infeasibility of measuring the elasticity of demand for a firm's prod-
uct that underlies the requirement, in merger, monopolization, and
other kinds of antitrust cases, of proving a relevant market. A rele-
vant market is simply a group of sellers assumed not to face strong
competition from other sellers, because no other sellers sell a close
substitute for their product. From this it is inferred that the group
has power to raise prices above the competitive level. But this con-
clusion is just a very crude way of saying that the elasticity of
demand for the sellers' product is relatively low. If that elasticity
could be measured directly, such measurement would provide a
much more direct and precise method of gauging monopoly or mar-
ket power than defining a relevant market and computing market
shares."' Proponents of overruling Illinois Brick and-Hanover Shoe
should ask themselves whether they really believe that the measure-
40 See R. POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 125 (1976).
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ment of supply and demand elasticities by the methods of litigation
is so far advanced that we can jettison relevant-market determina-
tion in antitrust litigation. as an appropriate corollary to overruling
the cases that reject the passing-on defense as infeasible.'
Although our analysis in this section has stressed enforcement
costs and incentives, it can also tell us something about compensa-
tion. If Illinois Brick were overruled, the ultimate indirect pur-
chaser-the consumer-could recover for the illegal overcharge, at
least if incentive effects and administration costs are ignored. But
other indirect purchasers and the direct purchaser, all of whom may
receive a share of the recovery, may not be injured, while some
people who are injured may not be allowed to recover. For example,
in the process of adjusting to the increased price of input A, the
direct purchaser may both decrease production and substitute to-
wards other inputs. So long as these inputs have supply curves that
are not perfectly elastic, their prices will increase or decrease de-
pending on the relative size of the substitution and output effects.
Since no one proposes that buyers or sellers of complementary or
substitutable inputs be given rights to sue, it follows that many
injured parties will not recover damages for antitrust violations even
if Illinois Brick is overruled.
C. Adverse Consequences of Allowing Both Direct and Indirect
Purchasers to Sue Even If They Are Equally Efficient Anti-
trust Enforcers
Even assuming (unrealistically, as the above analysis indi-
cates) that direct and indirect purchasers have identical total and
marginal costs of enforcement, a legal rule that apportions the re-
covery according to the damages suffered by each party will weaken
deterrence. To simplify the analysis, assume that there are only
three parties in the distribution chain: an indirect purchaser (con-
sumer), direct purchaser (retailer), and supplier (manufacturer).
Assume further that price fixing occurs at the manufacturing level,
and as before let x and 1- A equal the share of recovery received
by the direct and indirect purchasers respectively. Finally, assume
that the recovery does not include reimbursement of attorneys' fees
1 For another example of how, if one were confident of economists' ability to make
relatively precise estimates of elasticities, antitrust enforcement would be transformed, con-
sider the following: if the price elasticity of demand were relatively high for a product, then
a cartel would be unable to raise price much above the competitive level. Since enforcement
resources are scarce, it would make little sense in this instance to punish such a conspiracy.
The per se rule against price fixing could be discarded.
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or other litigation expenses, an assumption that will not affect our
results.
If the legal rule permitted recovery only by the direct pur-
chaser, which is the rule of Illinois Brick, x would equal 1. Al-
though the indirect purchaser would have no incentive to spend
resources on enforcement, this rule would maximize the direct pur-
chaser's incentive. In deciding on his optimal enforcement expendi-
tures the direct purchaser would attempt to maximize 7rd + the
difference between his expected recovery and his costs of enforce-
ment. Formally, he would maximize
rd PR-C d (y) (8)
which requires choosing a level of enforcement expenditures such
that
P'YRC -- o (9)
where p is the probability of discovering and convicting the anti-
trust violator, R the recovery, Cd the direct purchaser's enforcement
costs, and y the inputs of enforcement resources. 2 Both p and Qd
are assumed to be positive functions of the inputs of y-i.e., p =
p(y) and Cd Cdf(y) where an increase in y increases both the
probability of apprehending and convicting the violator. (Pl >0)
and the costs of enforcement (Cy > 0). Putdifferently, pyR and
C- denote respectively the marginal returns and marginal costs of
enforcement with respect to an increment in y, and equation (9)
states that in equilibrium the enforcer will equate marginal returns
to marginal costs. This is illustrated in Figure 3 where ^ equals the
equilibrium level of y.43
42 Note that y=yd + yi where yd = the direct purchaser's inputs and y i the indirect
purchaser's inputs. Since yl=O, we have y=yd.
"' We assume that the second-order conditions for a maximum are also satisfied when
pyR-CA = 0. This would occur, for example, if there were diminishing marginal returns
from enforcement and constant or increasing marginal costs. To simplify the presentation we
assume diminishing marginal returns and constant marginal costs.
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Figure 3
marginal
returns - - ------- ---- --------------- cy
and costs
I pyR
CI
II
II y
Now suppose that the indirect purchaser is also allowed to re-
cover. The direct purchaser would still maximize his expected gain
from enforcement, X pR - C d (yd), which yields
py R-CdyP =h- 0 (10)
But when x <1, this is equivalent to an increase in the direct
purchaser's marginal costs of enforcement, leading to a reduction in
his inputs of y from ^ to YA in Figure 3. In other words, a lower
expected recovery will induce him to reduce his level of expenditure
on antitrust enforcement. To illustrate, let X equal .5 and Cy equal
$1. It follows that the direct purchaser will increase his enforcement
inputs only up to the point at which $1 in marginal costs generates
$2 in marginal returns, because he receives only 50 percent of those
returns.
Although the direct purchaser has less incentive to spend on
litigation, it might appear that this reduction would be offset by
the creation of incentives for the indirect purchaser to spend. But,
surprisingly, this is not the case. In fact, in the example given, the
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indirect purchaser has no incentive to add even a dollar in expendi-
ture.4 At Yl units of enforcement inputs in Figure 3 the marginal
cost of an additional input to the indirect purchaser equals $1, but
aggregate marginal returns are slightly below $2. Thus, from the
indirect purchaser's viewpoint, a 50 percent share of these marginal
returns is less than his dollar marginal cost.45
If we relax the assumptions that enforcement costs are identical
and that X equals .5, enforcement will be carried to the point at
which
PyR-min (Cd/X ,1/(1_Xh)) 0 (11)
where min( ) denotes the minimum of either the direct or indirect
purchaser's marginal costs adjusted upward by his respective share
in the recovery. As equation (11) shows, when the parties have
identical enforcement costs, the level of y is lowest under an equal-
sharing rule. It also follows that if C < Ct., the level of enforce-
ment is greatest when X = 1-which is the rule of Illinois Brick."
The paradox of less enforcement with more potential enforcers
is simply an application to antitrust enforcement of the well-known
economic problem of external economies. Each party's expenditure
on enforcement confers a benefit on the other parties, but no one has
an incentive to take account of this external benefit in determining
the level of his own expenditures. There are, to be sure, incentives
to try to internalize the external benefits, thereby bringing the level
of enforcement closer to the Y^ level in Figure 3. One possibility is
11 He would, however, still have to spend the minimum amount necessary to maintain
himself as a. party to the suit. If these expenditures were counted as part of y, then y would
still not ihcrease above yj in Figure 3 because the direct purchaser would cut back on his y
to maintain y=yl.
11 One can reverse the sequence (i.e., have the indirect purchaser initially spend Yl and
show that the direct purchaser will then choose to spend nothing) without altering the funda-
mental resu.' that enforcement and hence deterrence of antitrust violations will fall with
nonexclusive enforcement rights. The fact that the outcome does not depend on the sequence
implies that though yl is the ultimate solution we do not know how the costs of will be
allocated between the two parties.
4 When C is included as part of the recovery the general solution to y is
pyR-mi (. C yd (1-p(1-Ie)) Y . (1-p(Ie))
where e is the percentage change in p from a one percent change in y. This has the effect of
lowering the plaintiff's marginal cost (since there is only a 1-p probability that he will bear
these costs) and increasing the level of enforcement compared to the example in the text. Our
result, however, that enforcement is maximized with exclusive rights assigned to the lowest
cost enforcer (the direct purchaser) still holds. Note further that if the defendant's costs were
assessed against the plaintiff when the prosecution was unsuccessful, this would offset to a
large extent the addition to recovery of the plaintiff's costs when the prosecution is successful.
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full cooperation and cost sharing. For example, if X = .5 and the
two parties cooperated fully, they might be able to agree to contrib-
ute $.50 each per unit of y costing $1. Full cooperation would push
their joint expenditures on y up to ^'. Cooperation, however, is
costly. Not only may the parties' interests conflict on certain issues
(for example, the amount of passing on, which determines X), but
each party has an incentive to take a free ride on the others. The
incentive to free ride is greater the greater the number of indirect
purchasers.
Another possibility is for one party to obtain exclusive enforce-
ment rights by buying the rights of the other party. Since these
rights will tend to be worth more to the party whose costs of enforce-
ment are lowest, the direct purchaser would be the one most likely
to acquire exclusive rights via a market transaction with the indirect
purchaser. Even if the courts enforce such contracts, however, there
are difficulties in developing a market for the transfer of enforce-
ment rights." First, there is a serious problem of holdouts, because
indirect purchasers will have an incentive to seek to extract the full
value of the expected gain from exclusive enforcement rights. Sec-
ond, if the number of indirect purchasers is large and difficult to
estimate, then the acquisition of rights from a group of indirect
purchasers will not preclude others from later asserting their
claim-possibly for the entire amount passed on to all indirect pur-
chasers. In sum, our analysis suggests that with nonexclusive rights
the parties will not be able to internalize fully the external benefits
created by their enforcement efforts and therefore that less enforce-
ment will result if Illinois Brick is overruled even if indirect purchas-
ers are as efficient antitrust enforcers as direct purchasers.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Although the theoretical case for believing that overruling
Illinois Brick would actually reduce the deterrent efficacy of anti-
trust enforcen~ent seems convincing to us, the question is ultimately
an empirical one. Unfortunately, the Illinois Brick decision is so
recent that its effect on antitrust enforcement cannot easily be
gauged. Studies by Handler and by Kirkham, however, provide in-
direct evidence.48 They show that direct-purchaser suits are far more
numerous than indirect-purchaser suits. This means, as a matter of
'7 For a detailed analysis of the theoretical problems of exchanging enforcement rights
see Landes & Posner, supra note 15.
Is See note 30 supra.
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simple arithmetic, that if legislation overruling Illinois Brick had an
equal but opposite effect on direct- and indirect-purchaser
suits-decreasing the former, and increasing the latter, by the same
number-the negative effect would outweigh the positive: the total
number of suits would fall. The studies also show-what everyone
knew-that there are an immense number of direct-purchaser suits
and no evidence of bashfulness on the part of such purchasers about
to sue.
The impact of Illinois Brick on the effectiveness of antitrust
enforcement can, however, be studied in a more systematic fashion.
Two approaches are possible. The first is to examine the effect of
earlier antitrust decisions, mainly Hanover Shoe,49 which strength-
ened the incentives of direct purchasers to sue. Although our theo-
retical analysis stressed the probably adverse consequences on pri-
vate enforcement of measures that weakened the incentives of direct
purchasers, the converse also follows-strengthening the direct
purchaser's incentives should increase the level of enforcement.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's holding in Hanover Shoe (as well
as similar holdings in lower courts prior to Hanover Shoe),5" which
barred a defendant from arguing that the direct purchaser was not
injured by the illegal overcharge because he had passed it on to
indirect purchasers, should have substantially strengthened direct,-
purchasers' incentives to uncover and prosecute violations. Thus we
predict an increase, other things being equal, in private enforcement'
in the period following Hanover Shoe compared to the period before.
The second approach involves examining the effect of Illinois
Brick on enforcement. Our analysis predicts that, other things being
equal, Illinois Brick would increase the level of private enforcement.
4' See text and notes at notes 3-4 supra.
5o Until 1964, the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits recognized the
passing-on defense, Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 260 F.2d 958 (1st Cir.
1958) (per curiam) (dictum), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959); Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958) (dictum); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-
Vacuum Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Clark Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Wolfe v.
National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955), while the
remaining circuits had either explicitly rejected passing on, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960);
Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), or had not
been presented with the question. In 1964 the Seventh Circuit and the Western District of
Washington, both of which had previously accepted the passing-on defense, rejected it, Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964); Public Util.
.Dist. No. 1 v. General Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1964). Thus by the time
Hanover Shoe was decided, only the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits recognized the
passing-on defense.
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Moreover, since two circuits (the Third and Eighth) and three dis-
tricts (New York Southern, Ohio Northern, and Colorado) had al-
ready adopted the rule of Illinois Brick prior to the Supreme Court's
1977 decision,5' we would predict that any increase in private en-
forcement after 1977 would take place primarily in those circuits
and districts not having an Illinois Brick rule before 1977. A major
difficulty with this analysis is that data are available for only a
single year following the Illinois Brick decision, and hence are not a
reliable indicator of the long-run effects of the decision.
To study the above questions, we used published data on pri-
vate antitrust cases filed in the district courts. Because of the seri-
ous limitations of these data, our empirical analysis is highly tenta-
tive. We note at the outset two serious data problems that probably
could be overcome by additional work, and a third that probably
could not be.
First, annual published data on private antitrust cases are of
cases commenced (that is, filed). If, for example, five plaintiffs
commence a suit against a defendant (or group of defendants) for
the identical violation, this may be recorded as five separate cases.
Yet for our purposes it should count as a single suit because we are
interested only in the enforcement of the antitrust laws against the
defendant. This factor creates a bias against finding a positive effect
on enforcement of Illinois Brick because the typical case involving
indirect purchasers will tend to have more plaintiffs and thus more
filings.
Second, the published data on private antitrust suits pertain to
all types of antitrust cases. Many cases involve no charges of price
fixing, and hence no direct and indirect purchasers, but instead are
brought by competitors or franchisees. Thus, data on total private
cases may be a poor approximation for the number of suits brought
by direct and indirect purchasers for an illegal overcharge. For ex-
ample, yearly variations in the number of antitrust suits brought by
competitors would generate variations in cases commenced in a
district that are unrelated to the direct- or indirect-purchaser issue.
Third, the number of case filings is a poor proxy for the effec-
tiveness of antitrust enforcement, in the same way that the number
of nuclear wars is a poor proxy for the effectiveness of the nuclear
SI Our sources are Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 464 n.1 (N.D. 111. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub. noma. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1978). These
sohrces are not entirely consistent, and we have had to exercise judgment in classifying states
on the basis of their pre-Illinois Brick position on indirect-purchaser suits.
1979]
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deterrent. If the rule of Illinois Brick is more effective in deterring
antitrust violations than a rule under which indirect purchasers are
permitted to sue, one might observe a drop in the number of cases
filed that could be completely consistent with the conclusion that
Illinois Brick had increased the effectiveness of private antitrust
enforcement.
Subject to these qualifications, we have attempted to deter-
mine the effect of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick on the number
of private antitrust cases filed. Table 1 traces the change in the
annual number of private antitrust cases filed since 1960. Columns
2 and 3 attempt to isolate the effects due to Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick from other factors affecting change in the number of
private antitrust cases. Part of the growth in private antitrust cases
may be due to a general growth over time in litigation. Column 2
attempts to net out this factor by examining the growth of private
antitrust cases relative to that of all private civil cases in the federal
courts. Other possible factors in the growth of private antitrust cases
are increasing numbers of antitrust violations and changes in the
number of government antitrust suits (since private plaintiffs can
often take a "free ride" on the government's case). Column 3 at-
tempts to correct for these factors by relating the number of private
cases to the number of government cases filed.
A. The Effect of Hanover Shoe
After these corrections are made it is still evident that the
number of private antitrust suits has been increasing rapidly.
Conceivably the strengthening of the direct purchaser's incentives
to sue brought about by the Hanover Shoe decision in 1968 is a
factor in the growth of private antitrust suits. Table 1 shows that
the ratio of private antitrust suits to all private civil cases averaged
.0159 in the 1960 to 1968 period but rose to .0202 in the 1969 to 1978
period. Thus, the share of private antitrust suits increased by
about 27 percent in the post-Hanover Shoe period. 5 Similarly,
the ratio of government civil to private antitrust cases fell from an
average of .0722 to .0414 between the pre- and post-Hanover Shoe
periods.-3
52 If we exclude the electrical machinery cases the difference between the pre- and post-
Hanover Shoe period is even more marked-a more than 100 percent increase from .1197 to
.0202.
- A factor that militates against attributing all of the differences between the pre- and
post-Hanover Shoe period to the impact of that decision is the more or less continuous growth
in'private antitrust cases dating back to 1960.
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Table 1
Private Antitrust Cases Commenced
in U.S. District Courts, 1960-1978
Ratio of Priv.
Antitrust to
Private Civil
Cases b
(2)
Ratio of
Gov't Antitrust
to Private
Antitrust
Cases c
(3)
.0061
.0101
.0500
.0096
.0090
.0116
.0174
.0131
.0152
.0162
.0174
.0257
.0227
.0197
.0197
.0193
.0199
.0213
.0191
.0159
.0202
.2632
.1111
.0204
.1368
.1652
.0805
.0499
.0718
.0728
.0581
.0593
.0415
.0616
.0469
.0325
.0407
.0339
.0292
.0293
.0722
.0414
SoURCE: data derived from
U.S. CoURTs ANN. REP. 77,
Tables 27 and 28, [1978] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
a Includes electrical industry cases (37 in 1961, 1739 in 1962, 97 in 1963, 46
in 1964, 29 in 1965, 278 in 1966, and 7 in 1967).
b Private civil cases exclude prisoner petitions.
c Government antitrust cases are civil only and include 9 electrical machinery
cases in 1961, 2 in 1962 and 3 in 1963.
Multiple regression analysis provides a more systematic
method of analyzing the time trend of private antitrust cases be-
cause it enables us to separate the effects on this variable of the
overall growth in private federal-court litigation and in government
antitrust activity from the effect of the Hanover Shoe decision. The
following variables were used in the regression analysis:
1979]
Priv.
Antitrust
Cases a(1)
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1960-
1968
1969-
1978
228
378
2005
380
363
472
722
543
659
740
877
1445
1299
1152
1230
1375
1504
1611
1435
5750
12668
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Y: annual private antitrust cases commenced in the
U.S. district courts
GOVT: annual government antitrust cases (civil, only)
commenced in the U.S. district courts
CIV: annual private civil cases (excluding antitrust)
commenced in the U.S. district courts
RATIO: the ratio of Y to CIV
TIME: time trend (1=1963, 2=1964, etc.)
HAN: proportion of circuits and districts per year that al-
lowed the passing-on defense. 4
Table 2 presents the results of our multiple regression analysis.
Each regression equation is estimated from annual data from 19.63
to 1977 and therefore contains 15 observations .55 In all equations the
HAN variable is statistically significant (at the .05 level or greater)
and has the predicted sign. That is, allowing the passing-on defense
to be raised is associated with a significant reduction in the number
of private antitrust cases; alternatively, disallowing the defense sig-
nificantly increases the number of antitrust cases. Specifically, our
regression analysis indicates that the Hanover Shoe decision is asso-
ciated with a 26 to 35 percent increase (equations 2-1 and 2-2 respec-
tively) in private antitrust cases commenced per year, holding con-
stant the overall time trend in civil litigation and the number of
government antitrust cases." Similarly, equation 2-3 indicates that
the ratio of private antitrust cases to private civil litigation (exclud-
ing antitrust) increased by about 33 percent in response to the
Hanover Shoe decision.
" This proportion was calculated as follows. For each year prior to Hanover Shoe we first
determined the circuits and districts that allowed the passing-on defense. See note 50 supra.
We then computed the proportion of private civil cases (excluding antitrust) in all district
courts commenced in the districts that allowed the passing-on defense. The proportions were
.299 in 1963, .313 in 1964, .158 in 1965, .161 in 1966, .163 in 1967, and .162 in 1968, and 0
after 1968. In estimating the impact of Hanover Shoe, or more generally of rejecting the
passing-on defense, the HAN variable enables us to take account of the reduction in the
number of districts, appropriately weighted to reflect their relative numerical importance in
federal cases, that permitted the passing-on defense prior to the Hanover Shoe decision.
The analysis was limited to these years for several reasons. First, we were not confident
of our ability to classify circuits and districts into those that permitted passing on prior to
1963 and those that did not. Second, the extraordinary total number of cases in 1962 (see
Table 1) due to the electrical machinery litigation suggests that this year should probably
be excluded from a time-series study. Finally, we excluded 1978 in order not to confound our
analysis with the impact of Illinois Brick.
" Since the proportion of districts permitting a passing-on defense was .162 in 1968 and
Hanover Shoe reduced this proportion to zero, the percentage change in private antitrust
cases associated with Hanover Shoe would equal (1.582) (.162) (100) and (2.187)(.162)(100) in
equations 2-1 and 2-2, respectively.
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Table 2
Regression Analysis of Private
Antitrust Cases, 1963-1977
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Equa-Depend- Independent Variables
tion. ent Con- b
No. Var. stant GOVT a TIME a CIV a HAN R 2  D.W. c
2-1 Y 5.482 .214 .071 - -1.582 .94 2.33
(7.42) (1.10) (4.00) (2.32)
2-2 Y 2.053 .114 - 1.123 -2.187 .94 2.27
(1.75) (.58) (4.09) (4.00)
2-3 RATIO 4.499 .124 .010 - -2.039 .82 2.25
(6.08) (.65) (.58) (3.06)
SOURCE: data derived from [1963-1977] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS ANN. REP.
a Y, GOVT and CIV are in natural logarithms.
b R 2 is the coefficient of determination.
c D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Although the impact of Hanover Shoe might appear to be unu-
sually large in view of the small proportion of the districts that
accepted the passing-on defense prior to Hanover Shoe, that deci-
sion would also have had effects both in districts that had not yet
ruled on the passing-on question and in those that had explicitly
rejected the passing-on defense prior to 1968. In the former, Hanover
Shoe would have removed the uncertainty surrounding the legality
of the passing-on defense and thus increased the incentives of direct
purchasers to bring suits. In the latter, some direct purchasers may
have decided against bringing marginal private suits because of the
possibility of the Supreme Court's upholding the passing-on defense
in Hanover Shoe.5
5 Overall, the regression equations in Table 2 explain a substantial share of the variation
(between 82 and 94 percent) of private antitrust cases in the 1963 to 1977 period. The TIME
variable in equation 2-1 indicates a 7 percent annual increase in private antitrust cases during
the 1963 to 1977 period whereas the CIV variable in 2-2 indicates that private antitrust cases
grew 12 percent more rapidly than did private civil litigation in general (e.g., a 5 percent
annual growth in civil litigation is associated with a 5.6 percent annual growth in private
antitrust cases). We also estimated an equation (not presented in Table 2) that included both
the TIME and log CIV variables. Since the correlation between TIME and log CIV is .97,
neither coefficient was significant in this regression. The coefficient on HAN, however, con-
tinued to have a negative and significant effect. The GOVT variable in Table 2, though
suggesting a positive relation between private and government cases, is not statistically
significant in any of the regressions. Similarly, the TIME variable in the RATIO equation
indicates the absence of a significant trend in the ratio of antitrust to other civil cases.
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B. The Effect of Illinois Brick.
The foregoing analysis provides support for our theoretical
conclusion that Hanover Shoe would strengthen antitrust dnforce-
ment by increasing the direct purchaser's incentive to sue. But our
effort to determine the effect on antitrust enforcement of Illinois
Brick itself was much less successful. A serious problem
is that post-Illinois Brick data are available for only one year
(fiscal 1978), and a single year's experience is too limited to support
confident inferences regarding the effect of Illinois Brick. This ca-
veat should be borne in mind in interpreting the empirical analysis
that follows.
Table I shows that private antitrust cases fell by 10.9 percent
(column 1) between fiscal 1977 and fiscal 1978-10.3 percent rela-
tive to all private civil cases (column 2). But before drawing any
firm conclusions regarding the impact of Illinois Brick, one should
note that these reductions are no greater than some that occurred
in earlier years. For example, private antitrust cases dropped by
10.3 percent from 1971 to 1972 and by 11.3 percent from 1972 to
1973. There are similar declines of 11.7 and 12.3 percent in these two
years for the ratio of private antitrust cases to all private civil cases
(column 2).
Table 3 divides the district courts into three classes: those that
barred indirect-purchaser suits prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Illinois Brick (column 1); those that permitted them (column
2); and those in which the standing of indirect purchasers was unde-
cided (column 3).11 The table indicates that the decline in the num-
ber of private antitrust cases filed in 1978 compared to the number
filed the year before was concentrated in districts where indirect-
purchaser suits had been allowed prior to Illinois Brick. Although
this result is contrary to our theoretical argument that Illinois Brick
strengthened antitrust enforcement (as well as our empirical find-
ings concerning the impact of Hanover Shoe), the statistics actually
provide little evidence that Illinois Brick has reduced the amount
of private activity. The further breakdown of Table 3 in the indirect-
purchaser districts shows that four districts (columns 4 to 7) ac-
count for virtually all of the drop in private antitrust cases even
though the four account for only 36 percent of the private antitrust
cases filed in the indirect-purchaser districts. And an analysis of the
annual variations in the four districts suggests that the sharp drop
from 1977 to 1978 was probably unrelated to Illinois Brick.
Finally, the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate no serious first-order autocorrelation problems
in the residuals.
's Inevitably, some subjective judgment entered into this classification of districts. See
note 51 supra.
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Table 3
Private Antitrust Cases
in District Courts 1969-1978
Classified by Direct and Indirect
Purchaser Rule
In-
direct
Pur-
Direct chaser
Pur- Per- Indirect
chaser mitted Un- California Ill.
Only to Sue clear Arizona North Cent. North
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1969 241 360 139 14 100 48 88
1970 317 417 143 20 90 48 81
1971 628 624 193 15 184 104 86
1972 389 655 255 11 150 98 101
1973 355 544 253 14 81 82 95
1974 316 615 299 22 76 78 65
1975 399 643 333 20 94 78 78
1976 429 756 319 19 164 88 96
1977 419 850 342 42 110 89 137
1978 404 691 340 22 71 69 87
SOURCE: data derived from [1968-1978] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN.
REP. and sources cited in note 51 supra.
District of Arizona. Although the number of cases dropped by
20 from 1977 to 1978, this decline may have been due not to Illinois
Brick but to the fact that the number of cases filed in 1977 was far
greater than in any previous year. The 42 cases filed in 1977 is an
outlying observation relative to the norm of the prior three years (19
to 22 cases) and thus the drop from 42 to 22 after Illinois Brick may
be simply a return to the normal trend. To attribute the 1977 to 1978
change to Illinois Brick, one would first have to explain the dramatic
increase from 1976 to 1977 and show that it was not a transitory
increase but somehow represented a permanent shift to a higher
level of enforcement in Arizona.
Northern District of California. Here we observe a reduction in
39 cases between 1977 and 1978, but, inexplicably, we also observe
an even larger reduction of 54 cases between 1976 and 1977. More-
over, there was a still larger drop of 69 cases between 1972 and 1973.
It is misleading to attribute the decline from 1977 to 1978 to Illinois
Brick when even larger declines occurred in two of five years prior
to Illinois Brick.
Central District of California. The decline of 20 cases between
1977 and 1978 may be the result of Illinois Brick, but, again, there
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was a drop of similar magnitude between 1972 and 1973.
Northern District of Illinois. The 70-case reduction between
1977 and 1978 may simply be the result of the abnormally sharp
increase in cases in 1977 (and possibly 1976). Again, unless there is
some reason to believe that the 1977 figure represented a permanent
increase in the level of antitrust enforcement, it would be incorrect
to attribute the subsequent decline to Illinois Brick.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis has suggested that the rule of Illinois Brick, which
bars indirect purchasers from bringing private antitrust damage
actions, is probably the soundest rule from the standpoint of max-
imizing the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. We anticipate
the argument that, however abstractly desirable it may seem to
confine enforcement to direct purchasers, to do so is to alter the
fundamental character of the private antitrust action in a way that
cannot be squared with the intent of Congress in creating private
damage remedies for antitrust violations. One way of characterizing
our position is that it allows someone who may not be injured (or
not injured much)-the direct purchaser-to recover (treble) dam-
ages while denying the right to recover any damages to other peo-
ple-indirect purchasers-who may in fact be injured. There is an
element of paradox in this result, but it is dispelled-by careful analy-
sis. As we have shown, even if indirect purchasers were given the
nominal right to sue, they would often fail to receive significant
compensation. And anyone troubled by the windfall element in the
judgment received by the direct purchaser must in logic reexamine
the entire structure of private 'antitrust enforcement. Two-thirds of
every private antitrust damage judgment (the punitive component
of the judgment) is a windfall to the purchaser." In a class action,
much of even the compensatory portion of the judgment may end
up in the pockets of lawyers or in state treasuries, rather than in the
pockets of the people who were actually harmed by the antitrust
violation. The windfall element cannot be purged from the private
antitrust suit without a complete reworking of antitrust enforce-
ment. Until that is done, society will be well-advised to allow some
direct purchasers to enjoy windfalls if, as we have argued, the direct-
59 This is something of an exaggeration since the "punitive" component can be viewed
in part (but only in part) as simply covering items of real damage, such as interest, that the
legal computation of compensatory damages excludes.
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purchaser suit is on balance a more effective instrument for enforc-
ing the antitrust rule prohibiting price fixing than the indirect-
purchaser suit.
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